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Abstract
Background: Several studies on decentralisation have used the ‘decision space’ approach to assess the breadth of
space made available to decision-makers at lower levels of the health system. However, in order to better
understand how decentralisation becomes effective for the health sector, analysis should go beyond assessing decision
space and include the dimensions of capacity and accountability. Building on Bossert’s earlier work on the synergy of
these dimensions, we analysed decision-making in the Philippines where governmental health services have been
devolved to local governments since 1992.
Methods: Using a qualitative research design, we interviewed 27 key decision-makers at different levels of the
Philippine health system and representing various local settings. We explored their perspectives on decision
space, capacities and accountability in the health sector functions of planning, financing and budget allocation,
programme implementation and service delivery, management of facilities, equipment and supplies, health
workforce management, and data monitoring and utilisation. Analysis followed the Framework Method.
Results: Across all functions, decision space for local decision-makers was assessed to be moderate or narrow
despite 25 years of devolution. To improve decision-making in these functions, adjustments in local capacities
should include, at the individual level, skills for strategic planning, management, priority-setting, evidence-informed
policy-making and innovation in service delivery. At institutional levels, these desired capacities should include
having a multi-stakeholder approach, generating revenues from local sources, partnering with the private sector
and facilitating cooperation between local health facilities. On the other hand, adjustments in accountability
should focus on the various mechanisms that can be enforced by the central level, not only to build the desired
capacities and augment the inadequacies at local levels, but also to incentivise success and regulate failure by
the local governments in performing the functions transferred to them.
Conclusion: To optimise decentralisation for the health sector, widening decision spaces for local decision-makers
must be accompanied by the corresponding adjustments in capacities and accountability for promoting good
decision-making at lower levels in the decentralised functions. Analysing the health system through the lens of
this synergy is useful for exploring concrete policy adjustments in the Philippines as well as in other settings.
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Background
Decentralisation could be defined as the transfer of
decision-making authority from higher to lower levels
of administration [1, 2]. In the Philippines, one major
motivation for pursuing decentralisation, not only of
local health services but also of other services (e.g. agri-
culture, infrastructure, social welfare, tourism, etc.),
was to empower communities to address their own
needs by bringing decision-making closer to them [3].
The Philippines decentralised government health ser-
vices in 1992 through devolution with the implementa-
tion of the Local Government Code [4]. At that time,
the Philippine Department of Health (DOH), the ministry
primarily responsible for the government health sector
nationwide, split the administration of health services
into the autonomous local governments across the ar-
chipelago, currently numbering 81 provinces, with 1490
municipalities and 145 cities within these provinces.
Under devolution, the national government, through
the DOH, continues to set the national objectives and
policies for the health system while implementation
and delivery of health services at local levels is the re-
sponsibility of the local governments. More specifically,
the provinces assumed responsibility for provincial and
district hospitals that provide secondary and tertiary
care, while municipalities within these provinces be-
came responsible for the Rural Health Units (RHUs)
that deliver primary care services. Cities, on the other
hand, may own both hospitals and RHUs and provide
both levels of care. After 25 years of devolution, opin-
ions about its impact to local health services continue
to vary [3, 5–8], and there have been attempts by vari-
ous political groups to amend the law in order to, on
the one hand, reverse devolution and re-centralise
health services once more [9–11] or, on the other hand,
expand decentralisation even further by changing the
current structure of government from a unitary repub-
lic into a federal form [12].
This ambivalence in the Philippines on whether or not
to decentralise is not unique, and even recent systematic
reviews that examined decentralisation in several coun-
tries have concluded that the evidence for its effective-
ness in improving health system performance is mixed
[13–17]. The dearth in the evidence is partly due to the
difficulty in measuring health sector decentralisation itself,
indeed a complex process which presents in various
shapes and sizes, such as devolution, deconcentration
or delegation [1, 18, 19], the boundaries of which may
not always be clear in any given context. It is therefore
not easy to compare decentralisation of health services
between different countries or settings without first
considering what health sector functions exactly are
decentralised, who are the decision-makers transferring
and assuming such functions, and at which levels of the
health system is decision-making made. Nevertheless,
we have previously argued that the complexity of de-
centralisation is not an excuse to leave it unexamined,
especially when it continues to be viewed as a strategy
for health sector reform [20]. The tool that has emerged
as useful for analysis is the ‘decision space’ approach
developed by Bossert [21], which examines the breadth
of space (i.e. ‘wide’, ‘moderate’ or ‘narrow’) within which
decision-makers are able to make decisions for the
functions they have taken on because of decentralisa-
tion. Decision space has been used to analyse health
sector decentralisation in several countries [22], such as
in Ghana and Zambia [23], Colombia and Chile [24],
Pakistan [25, 26], Fiji [27], India [28], Uganda [23, 29],
Kenya [30–33], Tanzania [34], and the Philippines [23].
We have also previously reported on the conditions
that make decentralisation effective in improving the
health system in the Philippines based on the decision
space approach [35].
Decision space, capacity and accountability
Many studies that draw from the decision space ap-
proach mostly focus on assessing the difference be-
tween de jure and de facto decision spaces, and often
reach the conclusion that de facto decision space at
lower levels remained narrow or moderate despite de-
centralisation in policy (de jure), which should have
granted a wider space. Thus, many studies make the
recommendation to widen de facto decision space further
in order to truly empower decision-makers at lower levels
of the system. However, two papers on Pakistan [25, 26]
stand out because these went beyond decision space and
explored its synergy with the dimensions of capacity and
accountability. Bossert et al. [25] have proposed visualisa-
tion of the synergy of these dimensions as three corners of
a triangular model whose complementary interactions
lead to improved service delivery, and have provided a
statistical justification for this synergy by assessing im-
provements in outcomes of the maternal and child health
programme after building the capacities of local decision-
makers in several districts in Pakistan [26].
Indeed, capacity-building is a favourite catchphrase in
health systems strengthening. Previous studies have already
shown a positive link between health system perform-
ance and individual [36] and institutional capacities [37].
Capacity-building can also be an overused term that
means no more than mere training, unless it is accom-
panied by a serious attempt to map the capacity com-
ponents to assess any impact to capacity enhancement
[38]. It may also be viewed to include not only the cap-
acitation of individuals and organisations but also the
enabling environment that nurtures it [39]. Thus, be-
yond individual and organisational capacities, the con-
cept of systemic capacity-building has been promoted
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to put in place structures and processes that support
optimal decision-making through time despite changes
in personnel or external interference [40].
Like capacity-building, accountability is also a buzz-
word in health systems, albeit even less tangible a con-
cept than the former. It may be understood to have two
general elements; first, providing an account (i.e. infor-
mation about the situation) and, secondly, holding into
account (i.e. a system of rewards and sanctions for per-
formance) [41]. However, the more important questions
are ‘who is accountable to who?’ and ‘how is this ac-
countability enforced?’ Understanding accountability
therefore necessitates identifying the linkages between
system actors and organisations where, on the one hand,
too few connections between decision-makers suggest less
control that can enable problems like corruption. On the
other hand, too many connections may suggest confusion
on who should be held responsible [42]. A recent study
has also proposed that interpersonal positive interac-
tions are a key to strengthening accountability in health
systems when they complement bureaucratic or audit-
style accountability mechanisms [43]. Accountability may
also be viewed in (although not limited to) the broad cat-
egories of financial accountability, which tracks budget
allocation and its correct utilisation; performance ac-
countability, which monitors successful attainment of
targets that were previously agreed upon; or political
accountability, which compels elected governments to
fulfil electoral promises, or those appointed to leader-
ship positions to exert a serious effort to address the
needs of the people they serve [42].
Taking into consideration that a synergy means that
the interactions of components produce an effect greater
than the sum of individual components, we modified
Bossert’s earlier model for the synergy into a three-di-
mensional figure of a pyramid that visualises the three
dimensions as a more dynamic and integrated whole
(Fig. 1). This modified pyramid model enables better
appreciation of the mutually reinforcing interactions
between the dimensions, such that the expansion of
one contributes to the enhancement of the others. For
example, we postulate that, as decision space is wid-
ened at local levels through decentralisation, the cap-
acities of local decision-makers would likewise need to
be expanded as they perform their new functions and
‘learn by doing’, which would also give them a sense of
ownership for their decisions and, thus, a better recog-
nition of their accountability. Similarly, building the
capacity of decision-makers would result in a better use
of their decision spaces, as well as a better appreciation
of their responsibilities, which hold them accountable
for the choices they make. Finally, strengthening ac-
countability mechanisms would influence how decision
space is used, and would also motivate the need to
build the capacities of decision-makers at lower levels
of the system.
Exploring the synergy in the Philippines
Using this synergy as a lens, we aimed to analyse how
to optimise decentralisation for the health sector in the
Philippines by describing the functions that have been
decentralised, examining the decision space available at
lower levels for these functions, identifying the capaci-
ties of local decision-makers that have to be expanded
to carry out these functions well, and exploring the
accountability mechanisms that the central level could
Fig. 1 The modified three-dimensional pyramid model for visualising the synergy of decision space, capacity and accountability in the context of
health sector decentralisation
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enforce to ensure good decision-making in these func-
tions. We then recommend a number of policy adjust-
ments based on this analysis to optimise the performance
of functions at local levels in the devolved Philippine
health system.
Methods
Following a qualitative research design, we developed
an interview guide for exploring the activities or tasks
where decision-making for the health sector is per-
formed at local levels in the Philippines. Using the first
author’s (HJL) personal and professional connections in
the Philippines, we then purposively selected and con-
tacted decision-makers who serve (or previously served)
in the government health sector and who represent a wide
range of local settings. HJL is also a citizen of the
Philippines who has been familiar with the country’s
health system through his work as an academic re-
searcher. Between January and April 2017, 27 decision-
makers were interviewed, up until the point when we
judged that saturation had been achieved [44]. The in-
terviews lasted 1 hour and 4 minutes, on average, and
were all performed face-to-face. Interview participants
were 17 (63%) males and 10 (37%) females who worked
in the Philippine government sector for an average of
23.6 years. While the methods of qualitative research
did not allow us to obtain a statistically representative
sample of informants for this study, purposive selection
of participants was undertaken with the aim of maxi-
mising the variation in their profiles in terms of current
roles and organisational affiliations, levels of decision-
making, and geographic locations. A summary of the
characteristics of these decision-makers is provided in
Table 1.
The proposal for this study was approved in the
Philippines by the National Ethics Committee (no. 2016–
013) and in Switzerland by the Ethikkommission Nord-
west- und Zentralschweiz (no. 2016–00738). This article
was written using the guidance provided by the Criteria
for Reporting Qualitative Research (COREQ) [45]. All
study participants read and signed an informed consent
form prior to the interviews, which were audio-recorded
and manually transcribed in Microsoft Word 2016. Infor-
mation on personal identities were replaced with codes in
the transcripts, accessible only to the authors to maintain
confidentiality. Each transcript was reviewed at least twice
while listening to the audio recording to ensure accuracy
of transcription and to improve familiarity with the data.
Transcripts were loaded into MAXQDA Standard 12
(VERBI GmbH Berlin 2018) for coding and analysis.
Data analysis was based on the Framework Method,
as previously described in the literature [46–48]. Building
on our previous analysis [35], we combined deductive and
inductive approaches in the sense that we began coding
Table 1 Summary of characteristics of the decision-makers
interviewed for this study. Additional details on their career
history and location of work assignments have been published
elsewhere (Liwanag and Wyss [35])
No. of interviewees 27
Males 17
Females 10
Highest educational attainment
MD plus Master’s degree 17
MD 5
Law degree 3
Master’s degree 1
Bachelor’s degree 1
Average duration of service in the public sector (years) 23.6
Average duration of the interviews (min) 64
Category of current roles
Career health officers (provincial, municipal and city
health officers)
10
DOH directors (national and regional directors) 6
Local politicians 6
Executive of PhilHealth 1
“Doctor to the Barrio” (i.e. DOH-hired physician
deployed to serve under a local government)
1
Medical school administrator 1
Government hospital administrator 1
Head of an NGO 1
Organisational affiliation at the time of interview
Local governments 15
DOH 6
NGOs 2
PhilHealth 1
Government hospital 1
Philippine Congress 1
Academe 1
Level of decision-making at the time of interview
National level 7
Regional level 3
Provincial level 4
City level 3
Municipal level 9
Not applicable 1
Geographic focus of role at the time of interview
Nationwide 6
Luzon 13
Visayas 1
Mindanao 7
DOH Department of Health, MD Doctor of Medicine, NGO non-governmental
organisation, PhilHealth Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
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using the trio of decision space, capacity and account-
ability as the initial thematic framework, which was
later populated with categories in an iterative fashion as
the coding was performed.
Health sector functions
As gathered from our interviews, we identified six
health sector functions, which we defined as broad cat-
egories of activities or tasks within which decision-making
is performed. The definitions used for these health sector
functions were based on definitions used in previous stud-
ies on decision space, which we subsequently modified
according to the experience in the Philippines. While
the boundaries of these functions would overlap in some
situations, we nevertheless organised these decentralised
functions according to the following:
1) Planning – development of plans for local health
services in a regular manner, involvement of
stakeholders in the planning process, and/or
implementation of what has been indicated in
these plans;
2) Financing and Budget Allocation – allocation of
budget (either from national/central or local sources)
to support local health services, creation of additional
sources of income to finance local health needs, and/
or utilisation of the local budget according to what it
was intended for;
3) Programme Implementation and Service Delivery –
implementation of health programmes at local
levels following national guidelines, implementation
of locally designed services that meet local needs and
are suitable to the local context, and/or provision of
services that satisfy the standards of quality;
4) Management of Facilities, Equipment and
Supplies – building the types and quantity of local
health facilities in areas where these are needed,
maintenance and upgrade of these facilities, and/
or providing the equipment and supplies (e.g.
medicines) required to make these facilities fully
functional;
5) Health Workforce Management – hiring (and firing)
the cadres and number of health workers required
to meet the needs of the local population, providing
adequate salaries and benefits for these health
workers according to the national standard rates,
and/or supporting their training needs and career
aspirations;
6) Data Monitoring and Utilisation – choosing the
indicators for monitoring the performance of
local health services, collecting these indicators in
an accurate and timely manner, performing data
management efficiently, and/or using the collected
data to inform decisions at local levels.
Assessment of decision space drew from the informa-
tion obtained during the in-depth interviews using a list
of guide questions that provided flexibility in assessing
the decision spaces available to decision-makers in the
performance of these functions as wide, moderate or
narrow, as well as their desired capacities and accountabil-
ity mechanisms that influence their decision-making in
these functions. An outline of these guide questions is
presented in Fig. 2, while an example of the full inter-
view guide is available as a supporting information file
in Liwanag and Wyss [35]. However, unlike a quantita-
tive approach that enables assessment of decision space
based on scores, our application of a qualitative approach
meant that our assessment relied on the various and com-
mon themes that emerged as the transcripts were analysed
following the Framework Method. To complement Fig. 2
and adapting from Bossert’s earlier criteria for assessing
decision space [21], we further provide Table 2 below as a
specific criteria for judging the space for each of the health
sector functions as wide, moderate or narrow. The
Additional file to this article also provides a selection of
illustrative quotes for each function together with an
explanation on how decision space was finally assessed
overall (Additional file 1). Briefly, we assessed decision
space for each function as wide if decision-makers at
lower levels are able to make decisions with wide lati-
tude, narrow if mostly unable to make decisions, and
moderate if somewhere in between. For functions
where decision space was assessed as moderate, yet a
number of interviews suggested that the space was nar-
row in certain situations, an assessment of moderate-
to-narrow was made. Given the outcome of decision
space assessment, we then analysed the desired capaci-
ties for local decision-makers, organised into institu-
tional and individual capacities, to be able to perform
each function well, and the accountability mechanisms,
organised as current and proposed, that can be enforced
by the central level to promote good decision-making in
each function.
Results
Planning
In the Philippines, where local governments (provincial,
municipal and city governments) have assumed the
ownership of health facilities and management of pub-
lic health programmes at local levels, decision space in
planning for local decision-makers was assessed as
moderate. While local governments, which are headed
by elected politicians, have long been granted the au-
thority to plan on their own, various experiences in the
Philippines suggest that successful planning relies on
the local government’s ability to plan well and on the
local politician’s (provincial governor or city/municipal
mayor) regular convening of the multi-sectoral Local
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Health Board (LHB), which may or may not meet de-
pending on the politicians' prioritisation of health con-
cerns during their term of office. This is consistent with
one previous study concluding that there were more
public health initiatives, community consultations and
spending for health in local governments with func-
tional LHBs compared to those whose LHBs did not
meet regularly [49]. To assist local governments in
planning, the DOH, through its regional offices, has
also been sponsoring and conducting the annual Invest-
ment Planning for Health, a mechanism through which
local government health personnel are given technical
assistance [50] and trained by the DOH on how to pre-
pare their health plans, identify needs, and request for
additional support from the national government for
the full implementation of these plans. Given this mod-
erate decision space, decision-making in planning may
be enhanced when local decision-makers have adequate
capacities for performing strategic planning in a regular
and timely manner and for involving multiple stake-
holders in the planning process. On the other hand,
some of the accountability mechanisms to promote
good decision-making in planning include requiring the
functionality of the LHB as a condition for local gov-
ernments to receive additional support from the na-
tional/central government, reviewing and approving
these plans at central/regional levels to ensure align-
ment with national objectives, and strict monitoring of
the implementation of these plans to ensure satisfactory
completion before further support from the national
government to these local governments could be pro-
vided in the future (Table 3).
Financing and budget allocation
Decision space for financing and budget allocation was
assessed to be moderate-to-narrow because the flexibil-
ity in making local funding decisions in the Philippines
largely depends on the income classification of the local
government. For instance, local governments in highly
urbanised cities get a bigger share (and, thus, more
choices for budgeting) of their Internal Revenue Allot-
ment from the national government, which is respon-
sible for pooling tax collection across the country and
redistributing the revenue to the various local govern-
ments based on a formula that considers local popula-
tion and land area. Consequently, local governments in
smaller provinces or rural municipalities get a smaller
share of their Internal Revenue Allotment, which is often
insufficient to support labour-intensive health services.
As a result, most local governments have relied signifi-
cantly on payments from the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (PhilHealth) [51, 52], which administers
the national social health insurance programme, to sustain
the operations of their health facilities. These observations
gathered from the interviews also complement previous
studies on the Philippines that noted dampened spending
s
Fig. 2 Outline of the guide questions posed during the interviews to explore decision-making in six functions and be able to assess the overall
breadth of decision space as wide, moderate or narrow. Follow-up questions related to capacities and accountability are likewise included. An
example of the full interview guide from which these questions were taken is available as supporting information in Liwanag and Wyss [35]
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for health by the local governments across the years, espe-
cially in provinces [5], as well as the dominance of narrow
electoral objectives in influencing financing decisions for
health [53]. Decision-making in financing and budget allo-
cation may then be optimised when local decision-makers
have adequate capacities for performing priority-setting
[54] (including an emphasis for primary/preventive care
services) and evidence-informed (rather than politically
motivated) funding decisions, as well as for creating alter-
native sources of income (except user fees that may re-
duce access) that are earmarked for financing local health
services. Accountability mechanisms may include requir-
ing local government-owned health facilities to meet the
minimum standards of quality before these are accredited
by PhilHealth to become eligible for receiving payments
for services provided. PhilHealth accreditation may also
Table 2 Criteria used for assessing decision space at local levels for the purpose of qualitative analysis (adapted from Bossert [21])
Health sector
function
Indicator Decision Space
Narrow Moderate Wide
a. Planning Local decision-makers
prioritise and develop
their own health plans
Local planning possible
only if with assistance
from the central level
Local planning already taking
place, but only optimal if
accompanied by significant
assistance from the central level
Local planning optimal despite
minimal involvement of the
central level
Local decision-makers
implement the plans that
they developed
Implementation possible
only with central level
support
Implementation being done but
only completed if central level
support is available
Full implementation possible
even without central level
support
b. Financing
and Budget
Allocation
Local decision-makers
have their own sources of
income to finance health
services
Financing mostly
dependent on central
sources of funds
Mixed financing, such that local
sources of financing are
augmented with central sources
Financing mostly provided
by local sources of funds
Local decision-makers
spend the budget
allocated for health
services
Spending mostly
restricted by guidelines
imposed by the central
level
Some of the budget controlled by
the local level, and some regulated
by the central level
Spending mostly follows how
local decision-makers wish to
use the budget
c. Programme
Implementation
and Service
Delivery
Local decision-makers
implement their own
health programmes
and services
Local programmes and
services mostly follow
only what is promulgated
from the central level
Local programmes and services follow
nationally mandated programmes but
also include locally initiated and
innovative programmes that address
local needs
A good number of innovative
programmes and services
implemented at local levels
with little supervision from
the central level
Local decision-makers
deliver health services
with good quality
Local programmes and
services implemented
with poor quality
Local programmes and services
implemented with good quality
when central level provides additional
support and training
Local programmes and services
implemented with good quality
despite minimal central level
involvement
d. Management
of Facilities,
Equipment
and Supplies
Local decision-makers
put up the number
and type of health
facilities needed in
their areas
Local facilities built and
upgraded mostly
through central support
Some facilities built and upgraded by
the local level but still a large number
of constructions or renovations
provided by the central level
Local facilities built and
upgraded mostly through the
local level’s own efforts
and resources
Local decision-makers
ensure functionality of
these facilities with
adequate equipment
and supplies
Local facilities mostly rely
on central support for
equipment and supplies
Mixed, such that equipment and
supplies are provided by both
the local and central levels
Local facilities adequately
equipped and supplied from
the local level’s own efforts
and resources
e. Health
Workforce
Management
Local decision-makers hire
(and fire) the health
workforce needed by
the local population
Local levels unable to
hire the workforce
needed
Local levels able to hire some of the
workforce required, but central level
augments many vacancies through
deployment of its own staff
Local levels able to hire most
of the workforce on their own
Local decision-makers
support the career
development of the
health workforce
Few opportunities at
local levels to support
the career development
of their workforce
While local levels can support the
career development of their
workforce, a big chunk of training
is still provided by the central level
Training and support for the
career development of the
workforce sufficiently provided
by local levels
f. Data Monitoring
and Utilisation
Local decision-makers
collect the relevant
indicators
Data collection delayed
and poorly validated,
unless the central level
requires and enforces it
Local levels collect the data in a
timely and accurate manner when
assistance is provided by the central
level
Timely and accurate data
collection despite minimal
intervention from the
central level
Local decision-makers
use the data to inform
actions
Utilisation of the collected
data for actions at local
levels not practiced
Local levels collect the data, but
central level provides guidance
on how to use the data
Data clearly used for actions
by the local levels themselves
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Table 3 Assessment of decision spaces and the desired adjustments in capacities and accountability mechanisms for the health
sector functions of (a) Planning, (b) Financing and Budget Allocation, and (c) Programme Implementation and Service Delivery
Health sector
functions, i.e.
activities or
tasks that involve
decision-making
Illustrative quotesa What is the
decision
space at
local levels?
What capacities of local decision-
makers are desired?
What accountability mechanisms
can be put in place by the
national/central level?
Planning Mayor of a low-income municipality
who is also a medical doctor, 26 years
in government:
“National government wants LHBs to
be functional, but it’s up to us to make
it functional. We meet for the municipal
health action planning, which flows from
the Barangay [village] health action
planning. So the municipal plan is a
consolidation of the various Barangay plans.
The DOH has a representative in the LHB,
and that is very good because the mayor
does not know everything. It’s a
coincidence that the mayor here is a
doctor, but how about those areas
whose mayor is not a doctor? We
need help from the DOH for the
technical aspects, for example, in the
family planning programme,
immunisation, etc. We also review our
shortcomings. But, you know, it varies
from one municipality to another
[laughs]. That is the disadvantage of
devolution, right? The way things are
is not uniform and depends on
municipal leadership.”
Moderate Institutional:
• Institutional commitment to
perform the planning
process regularly
• Openness to the
participation of multiple
stakeholders in the planning
process
Individual:
• Strategic planning skills
Currently in place but may be enhanced:
• Technical assistance to local
governments for performing
planning effectively
• Local plans reviewed and approved
at central/regional levels to ensure
alignment with national objectives
• Monitoring by the central/regional
levels of local plan implementation
Potential policy consideration:
• Continuing augmentation for local
health services conditional on local
government’s regular conduct of
planning and satisfactory
implementation of previous plans
Financing
and Budget
Allocation
Provincial Health Officer of a
high-income province, 21 years
in government:
“About 25–27% of our Internal Revenue
Allotment is allocated for our hospitals,
and about 5–7% for preventive services.
I have an income recovery scheme here.
The province provides the budget for
maintenance and other operating
expenses of hospitals, but I tell the
hospitals to recover at least 90% of that
and return the funds to the province.
The hospitals are able to recover it
through their PhilHealth income, and
also through income from services not
covered by PhilHealth but outpatients
pay for, such as ultrasound or CT scan.
So majority of our local budget is used
for hospital operations, and that’s
curative, right? That means we spend
so little for preventive services, which
should have a bigger investment.
This is what I want to ask from DOH,
to provide additional funding to
enhance our delivery of public
health programmes.”
Moderate-
to-narrow
Institutional:
• Ability to create alternative
income sources (except user
fees which may reduce
access) that are earmarked
for local health services
Individual:
• Skills for priority-setting, with
an emphasis for primary/pre-
ventive care
• Capacity for evidence-
informed, rather than politic-
ally motivated, funding
decisions
Currently in place but may be enhanced:
• Strict implementation of PhilHealth
guidelines that limit local
governments to use their
PhilHealth income exclusively
for health-related needs
Potential policy consideration:
• Accreditation of local health
facilities to be eligible for
reimbursements from PhilHealth
may include a requirement for local
governments to provide a minimum
allocation (depending on income
class) from its own local budget as
counterpart to finance local
health services
Programme
Implementation
and Service
Delivery
High-level official of the DOH Central
Office, 28 years in government:
“As the devolution process evolved, and
as local governments become more
capable to handle their health services,
there were circulars issued by the DOH
programmes in the central office to
ensure quality, for example, on how to
package the tuberculosis control
programme for their locality. Some of
Moderate Institutional:
• Willingness to cooperate
with neighbouring local
governments for a functional
service delivery network for
sharing of resources and
inter-facility patient referrals
Individual:
• Innovation in the delivery of
local health programmes
Currently in place but may be
enhanced:
• Development of technical
guidelines that maintain fidelity in
the delivery of nationally mandated
programmes at local levels
• Training of local government staff
in implementing these programmes
• Strengthening of service delivery
networks by strategically grouping
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include a requirement for the local government to provide
a minimum allocation from its own budget as counterpart
for financing local health services. Moreover, existing na-
tional guidelines on the utilisation of PhilHealth income
by local governments should be strictly enforced in order
to push local governments to spend the fund exclusively
for health-related expenses alone, with future reimburse-
ments from PhilHealth conditional on the local govern-
ment’s compliance with these guidelines.
Programme implementation and service delivery
Decision space for programme implementation and ser-
vice delivery was assessed as moderate considering that
local governments in the Philippines are already able to
develop and implement their own health programmes,
but at the same time mostly relying on the health pro-
grammes being promulgated by the DOH from na-
tional/regional levels for implementation at local levels.
However, the devolved structure of governance may
also result in weak implementation of programmes such
as what was noted for the malaria control programme in a
previous study [55], where ineffective linking between
central and local levels resulted in inconsistent implemen-
tation by local governments that failed to adhere to the
national objectives of the programme. Thus, decision
space may be better used when local decision-makers have
the capacity for innovation in the delivery of health pro-
grammes (while maintaining fidelity to national objectives)
that address specific local needs, more appropriate to the
culture, and thus more effectively implemented at local
levels. Local governments may also be better equipped to
perform this function if they have the capacity to cooper-
ate with other neighbouring local governments [6], despite
each being distinct political units as a result of devolution,
to constitute a functional service delivery network that
facilitates coordination of patient referrals, or resource
sharing for more efficient delivery of care (e.g. sharing
medicines when the health facility of another local gov-
ernment has stockouts, or allowing health professionals
to assist temporarily in a neighbouring health facility
owned by a different local government that lacks staff ).
Accountability in this function may be strengthened
when national/central decision-makers maintain its
responsibility for developing and enforcing the tech-
nical guidelines to be complied with by the local govern-
ments in the delivery of nationally mandated health
programmes (e.g. expanded programme on immunisation,
tuberculosis control programme, or non-communicable
diseases control programme, etc.), including the train-
ing of local government health staff who will carry out
these programmes at local levels. The national/central
level may also strengthen accountability by using, as an in-
centive, the recognition and promotion of innovative
health programmes developed by some local governments
that can be emulated by other local governments, and also
by facilitating the grouping of adjacent local governments
to constitute functional service delivery networks.
Management of facilities, equipment and supplies
Decision space for the management of facilities, equip-
ment and supplies was assessed as moderate because
local governments already have full management con-
trol over health facilities that they own, but nevertheless
also continue to depend on continuing assistance from
the DOH for the upgrade of their facilities, including the
provision of equipment and supplies (e.g. medicines,
vaccines, contraceptives, laboratory diagnostic kits, etc.)
for use in these facilities. Decision space for this func-
tion may be optimised when local decision-makers are
equipped with the adequate management skills needed
for running health facilities and programmes effectively.
Such capacities may in fact already be possessed by the
Table 3 Assessment of decision spaces and the desired adjustments in capacities and accountability mechanisms for the health
sector functions of (a) Planning, (b) Financing and Budget Allocation, and (c) Programme Implementation and Service Delivery
(Continued)
Health sector
functions, i.e.
activities or
tasks that involve
decision-making
Illustrative quotesa What is the
decision
space at
local levels?
What capacities of local decision-
makers are desired?
What accountability mechanisms
can be put in place by the
national/central level?
these guidelines sought to remedy the
negative aspects of devolution, and so
the concept of interlocal health zones or
service delivery networks to group local
governments together emerged to
encourage different local governments
serving the same catchment area to
deliver health services in a
harmonised manner.”
(while maintaining fidelity to
national objectives) that
address unique health needs
and are suitable to the local
context
local governments together and
facilitating their interlinking
with one another
Potential policy consideration:
• Wider recognition and promotion
of models of innovative service
delivery programmes by
local governments
aOnly a few illustrative quotes could be presented here due to space limitations. Please refer to Additional file 1 for the full list of illustrative quotes, which form
the basis of the assessment of decision space and the recommendations for capacity and accountability
DOH Department of Health, LHB Local Health Board, PhilHealth Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
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local government health officer, the career health official
employed by the local government to manage local health
services, but not by the elected governor or mayor who
may lack the technical understanding or appreciation
of the significance of public health. Capacities for local
governments to engage the private sector may also be
expanded so that some aspects of service delivery can
be made more efficient through public–private partner-
ships. Examples of such partnerships in selected local
governments in the Philippines include outsourcing the
provision and maintenance of expensive equipment re-
quired by the provincial hospital (e.g. x-ray machine,
ultrasound machine, or CT scanner) where the income
from the use of the equipment is shared by the local
government and the private provider. Another example
is the provision of a steady supply of medicines in the
local government hospital through a consignment
agreement with a private seller, which not only mini-
mises drug stockouts but also enables the local govern-
ment to pay only for the medicines that are actually
used. On the other hand, strengthening accountability
in this function may be achieved when central/regional
decision-makers strictly enforce licensing of local gov-
ernment health facilities to maintain quality, but at the
same time provide technical assistance to those local
governments that are struggling to achieve accredit-
ation for their health facilities. Another mechanism is
for the central/regional level (i.e. DOH) to perform
pooled or central procurement of selected supplies (e.g.
medicines and vaccines) on behalf of local governments
nationwide for the purpose of maintaining leverage in
price negotiation, rather than let each individual local
government negotiate on its own. These supplies are
then provided as augmentation for local health facilities
subject to the local government’s satisfactory utilisation
of previous augmentations. In the Philippines, the
DOH has also been running a Health Facility Enhance-
ment Programme that allows the use of national/cen-
tral funds for the construction of new (or upgrade of
existing) local government health facilities. However,
such central support through the Health Facility En-
hancement Programme must require the provision of
counterparts from the local government. For example,
the DOH may spend for the expansion of a provincial
hospital or the renovation of a city or municipal RHU,
but the local government that owns it will be required
to hire the additional number of health workers needed to
fully operate the upgraded facility. Moreover, strengthen-
ing current mechanisms for licensing and accreditation
of local government health facilities by the DOH and
PhilHealth, respectively, may be one way to enhance
quality, as a previous attempt that relied on certifica-
tion alone failed to improve the quality of services in
these facilities [56] (Table 4).
Health workforce management
Decision space for health workforce management was
assessed to be moderate-to-narrow. While local govern-
ments already have full control over the management of its
health workers, in many rural areas, the local governments
are unable to hire the minimum number of health workers
they need due to their lack of resources to pay for their sal-
aries or the absence of an incentive for health workers to
serve in these far-flung areas [3]. In local governments that
are able to hire, the salaries and benefits vary depending on
the financial capacity of the local governments, despite an
existing law that provides for standard salary rates for
health professionals. Many local governments have thus re-
lied on the DOH’s long-established deployment programme
of health workers, such as the Doctors to the Barrios
programme, to augment their health workforce needs. This
deployment programme has enabled the DOH to hire phy-
sicians, nurses, midwives, dentists and medical technolo-
gists who are sent to serve in many local government
health facilities across the country [57]. Desired capacities
for local governments may then include having adequate fi-
nancial resources to hire the cadres and quantity of health
workers which their population requires, and to provide
the full range of salaries and benefits, including security of
tenure, for these health workers. Local governments may
also be capacitated further when they are granted with the
regulatory authorisation to hire more health workers as
deemed necessary (of note, the national government’s Com-
mission on Audit currently puts a cap on the percent-
age of the budget that can be used for salaries of all local
government personnel, combining health and non-health
personnel, yet local health services would often require
more personnel than what is allowed). Such capacities may
be complemented by accountability mechanisms that in-
clude the central/regional levels requiring local govern-
ments that benefit from the deployment programme not
only to provide counterpart support for the staff they re-
ceive (e.g. free housing or transportation allowance for the
deployed health workers), but more so to carry out a
medium- to long-term plan to prepare the necessary local
budget adjustments to hire the required workforce on their
own in the near future. Without such conditionalities, local
governments may become constantly dependent on the
national government for its health workforce needs. Other
accountability mechanisms may include the national/cen-
tral level taking responsibility for building the capacity of
local government health workers across the country [58],
as well as implementing a national policy that discourages
local health workers from being partisan during local elec-
tions in order to insulate them from politicisation.
Data monitoring and utilisation
Finally, decision space for data monitoring and utilisation
was assessed as moderate because local governments are
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already primarily responsible for collecting health-related
data at local levels and for transmitting these data to the
regional and central levels for consolidation by the DOH.
Nevertheless, experiences in the Philippines suggest that
many local decision-makers perform data collection out of
mere compliance and sometimes lack the capacities for
utilising the data to initiate actions at local levels. Thus,
local decision-makers may optimise their decision space
for this function when their capacities in basic epidemi-
ology and evidence-informed public health are enhanced
so that they understand what the indicators mean and how
they can translate the data into effective decision-making.
Accountability mechanisms in this function can include
the DOH at national or regional levels deploying its own
data collectors to local governments to validate the data be-
ing reported, and also to accelerate the transmission of the
data to the central level. Such a scheme was recently intro-
duced in the Philippines through the DOH’s deployment of
‘public health associates’, who perform parallel data collec-
tion at local levels. Furthermore, the national/central level
may consider publicising an annual ranking of local
governments in terms of meeting selected target health
outcomes in order to inform the population of the per-
formance of the local politicians they have elected in of-
fice, and likewise maintain a reliable central electronic
database through the Field Health Services Information
System [59], which pools all health-relevant indicators
from local levels and is essential for accurately assessing
the state of the Philippine health system as a whole.
Discussion and conclusion
The results we have presented here are part of our ef-
forts to understand how to make decentralisation work
for the health sector [20, 35], this time focusing on the
synergy of decision space, capacities and accountability.
These results offer several opportunities for adjusting
the capacities at local levels and strengthening account-
ability mechanisms to promote good decision-making
in the devolved health system of the Philippines. The
Framework Method used to analyse our interviews has
allowed us to compare the perspectives between central/
regional and local levels of decision-making which, for
some functions, may be contrasting views. For example,
in planning, some of the decision-makers at local levels
felt they had the flexibility to plan on their own but
some of the decision-makers at central/regional levels
expressed that local plans were not fully implemented
(Additional file 1). By comparing varying perspectives,
we have triangulated these views and aimed to obtain
an overall assessment of decision space for each func-
tion that drew from a synthesis of multiple views. Con-
sequently, our analysis indicates that decision spaces at
local levels have been mostly moderate or narrow des-
pite 25 years of devolution in the Philippines.
The Philippine experience suggests that the moderate-
to-narrow decision spaces observed at local levels are
less the result of the national/central level refusing to
grant the space, but more an indication of local decision-
makers having inadequate capacities to fully perform the
functions they have assumed in the aftermath of devolu-
tion. It would then appear that a truly wide decision space
at local levels cannot be achieved unless it is accompanied
by expanding capacities and strengthening accountability
mechanisms. It is important to emphasise that the goal of
this paper was not to prove this synergy. Bossert’s study in
Pakistan has already provided a quantitative justification
of how expanding each of these three dimensions po-
tentially leads to improvements in selected health out-
comes [26]. Through a qualitative approach, we have
been able to explore a number of specific policy consid-
erations under the assumption that the synergy works.
Several studies on decentralisation in other low- and
middle-income countries have also concluded that de-
centralisation only grants the decision space, but its ef-
fective use by decision-makers at lower levels of the
system will be realised only when their capacities are
built, as was reported, for example, in Fiji [60] and in
India [28]. Particularly for the function of planning and
priority-setting, capacity-building can improve the use
of decision space as noted in Tanzania [61], and en-
hance transparency and accountability as likewise noted
in India [62] and again at district levels in Tanzania [63].
We have presented a list of desired capacities, organised
as individual and institutional/organisational capacities,
to help improve the delivery of care in a devolved health
system. At individual levels, these include, among others,
skills for strategic planning, management, priority-setting,
evidence-informed policy-making and innovation in ser-
vice delivery. At institutional levels, these desired capaci-
ties include, among others, having a multi-stakeholder
approach, generating revenues from local sources, part-
nering with the private sector, and facilitating cooper-
ation between local health facilities. In the context of
decentralisation, the responsibility for building the cap-
acities of local decision-makers and the local govern-
ments which they constitute remains with the national/
central decision-makers (i.e. the DOH and PhilHealth
in the case of the Philippines).
In all health sector functions, we have noted a signifi-
cant amount of augmentation provided by the national/
central government in the Philippines to fill in the gaps
of the local governments, especially in resource-poor
areas, to fulfil their mandate to deliver quality health
services to the populations they serve. This continuing
intervention from the national/central level indicates
the importance of analysing not only the roles of local
level decision-makers but also the evolving role that cen-
tral decision-makers play in decentralisation. Studies in
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other low- and middle-income countries have also re-
ported some forms of re-centralisation despite decentral-
isation, such as in financing in Kenya [31], in ensuring
equity in the distribution of physicians and health facilities
in Indonesia [64], and in logistics systems or management
of supplies in Ghana and Guatemala [65], where the evi-
dence indicates the importance of having a combination
of decentralised and centralised functions for optimal per-
formance. With rapid transitions to decentralisation, simi-
lar to what happened in the Philippines, there have been
similar disruptions in procurement resulting in drug
stockouts in Kenya [32], as well as variations in the sal-
aries of the health workforce resulting in strikes and
mass resignations also in Kenya [32] and affecting the
retention of primary care workers in rural areas in
Nigeria [66]. These examples highlight, all the more, the
important function of the central level to enforce account-
ability and shepherd the entire system as a whole to
minimise such disruptions even as the system remains
decentralised overall.
While there are multiple aspects to accountability,
herein, we have focused on accountability mechanisms
that the national/central level could enforce in a decentra-
lised health system. The mechanisms we have enumerated
encompass the aspects of financial (i.e. accounting the al-
location and use of resources), performance (i.e. meeting
the targets) and political (i.e. publicising the performance
of local governments to inform voters) accountabilities
as described in the introduction of this article. These
accountability lines that link local decision-makers to
national/central decision-makers offer opportunities for
rewarding satisfactory performance of local govern-
ments with incentives and discouraging negligence in
decision-making through regulation (i.e. a ‘carrot and
stick’ approach), and our results present current mecha-
nisms that could be enhanced, as well as potential policy
considerations in the Philippines based on the perspec-
tives of the decision-makers we have interviewed.
These insights from the Philippines draw from a grow-
ing realisation to move beyond linear causation towards
more complexity-informed thinking [67]. Particularly for
the Philippines, the solution to the challenges in its
health sector may not come from either recentralising
the health sector once more, or leaping towards federal-
ism, but potentially from focusing on enhancing capacities
and accountability regardless of what the governance
structure of its health sector may be. By moving beyond
an analysis of decision space alone through the lens of this
synergy, we have explored opportunities for optimising
decision-making at local levels with a four-step approach
that first identified the decentralised function, then quali-
tatively analysed the decision space at lower levels for each
function, and assessed the capacities and accountability
adjustments required to improve decision-making within
each function. This way of proceeding was useful to cap-
ture the complexity of analysing decentralisation and to
yield concrete policy actions to be considered for the
Philippines. Further studies on the Philippines may also
explore the experiences of devolution for other sectors
(e.g. agriculture, social welfare, public works, tourism, etc.)
and compare lessons learned. In other words, to optimise
decentralisation for the health sector, decision space at
lower levels should indeed be widened, without forgetting
to expand capacities and strengthen accountability. Bos-
sert himself wondered if the synergy that he has demon-
strated in Pakistan would also work in other settings [68].
It will be equally interesting and useful for policy, using a
combination of methods, to see what recommendations
emerge in analysing decentralisation in other settings
using the lens of this synergy in order to truly optimise de-
centralisation for the health sector in the Philippines and
other countries.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Selected illustrative quotes extracted from the
interviews, analysed using the Framework Method, and which provided
basis for assessing decision space for each function as wide, moderate or
narrow. The assessed decision spaces are linked to the dimensions of
capacity and accountability in Tables 3 and 4 in the article. (PDF 211 kb)
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